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## everywhere rapidly

**The Magazine of the NATO
Rapid Deployable Corps - Italy**

NRF 18
On watch for the Alliance

NATO
OTAN

NRDC - ITA
UBIQUE CELERE

NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Italy
Ubique Celere

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NRDC-ITA Commander
Lt. Gen. ITA (A)
Roberto PERRETTI

FOREWORD

"NRDC-ITA has been fulfilling its stand-by role as a Land Component Command (LCC) for the NATO Response Force 2018 (NRF18) since 1st January this year and will retain this responsibility until December.

The NRF offers a credible military option to NATO, and any deployment would be a political statement of collective Alliance resolve aimed at reassuring Alliance members and deterring potential adversaries' presence and activities.

The security environment in Europe over recent years has changed dramatically due to a number of complex crises. This situation is compounded by the rapid growth and proliferation of new technologies easily acquired by both state and non-state actors.

Facing this complexity, with Italy as its framework nation, NRDC-ITA is a 3* multinational HQ of more than 400 men and women representing 15 allied Nations, united to demonstrate Alliance cohesion and solidarity and the status of NRF18 LCC offers my HQs and its Very high readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) the opportunities to demonstrate their capability, readiness, credibility and legitimacy to contribute to NATO's core tasks. We are requested to maintain our capabilities up to the standard needed in all areas and this covers personal commitment, discipline and training. NRDC-ITA's posture and capacity is being continuously developed, through improving effectiveness, readiness and responsiveness. Thus, NRDC-ITA is fully contributing to NATO's efforts aimed at strengthening deterrence and defence and projecting stability beyond borders.

The transition of NRDC-ITA from its JTF role to the LCC Stand-by period as NRF was launched in 2016 and it has come a long way in a very short time. During Exercise BRILLIANT LEDGER 2017, we were certified by LANDCOM (LC) and we received top scores in our Combat Readiness. The hand-over Ceremony conducted in January was not the accomplishment of our mission but only its beginning, constantly ensuring that NRDC-ITA's motto

"everywhere rapidly" is a reality. The Comprehensive approach, and our innovation, joint mindset, partnership and provision of training will complement our mission.

The 3 key words that I want my team to get accustomed to and have to steer its work and decisions, are: Readiness, Effectiveness and Survivability. There is no doubt that this year is challenging this HQ to maintain and improve those capabilities, but I intend to meet these challenges continuously, presenting a stronger HQ that is ready to serve as the LCC for NRF18 and later as a Corps and JTF HQ.

NATO is adapting rapidly and this HQ, as part of the Land Graduated Response Forces (GRF-L), is one of the first responders for the defence of the Alliance and I am confident that all soldiers, seamen, airmen and Carabinieri serving in this HQ will perform enthusiastically.

Well integrated in the Italian regional social fabric, NRDC-ITA's strength also lies in the value, the professionalism, the expertise and the involvement of its men and women in uniform, who work, train and are prepared to fight side by side. Efficiency, readiness and survivability are features that they have all embraced. At the forefront of intellectual debates and supporting doctrine developments, they all contribute to NRDC-ITA being a high quality training provider as well as an incubator of ideas.

Committed 360° to defending NATO members, NRDC-ITA naturally focuses also on the threats emerging from NATO Strategic Direction South.

While drawing on experience gained and lessons learned, this HQ is also constantly adapting to work well in complex environments. In this regard, new organisation and concepts are tested and implemented, joint and inter-agency mindsets are internally promoted, digital engagement is a reality, capacity building is developed and partnerships for the future are secured.

NATO faces considerable challenges and complex adaptation. We exist and operate within this sphere, and therefore we must understand it and act in an agile and responsive manner. We must continue to build on the good work of previous years, developing and enhancing our capabilities. We will continue thinking, training and exercising to proper levels of complexity in consideration of our commitment as NRF LCC. It is critical that we are honest about our intentions and ambitions. Whatever role and mission we will undertake, we must sponsor a joint mindset and streamline our interoperability with our affiliated units. We will pass our best practices to other NATO entities while recognising areas we may improve within our organisation.

We must continuously develop and improve our skills and ensure they are appropriately maintained through a robust and challenging training program.

Additionally, as part of maintaining the intellectual edge of the HQ, this magazine and the other written outputs of our staff are a vital method of disseminating new ideas and concepts and induce also both junior staff and experienced practitioner to a wider intellectual confrontation.

I am absolutely confident this HQ will continue achieving success within this turbulent and complex period. It will not be easy, but I firmly believe we have the right people in the right place and the support we need".

COL. **Daniel ZOUGGARI** [FRA-A] HQ NRDC-ITA – STRATCOM ADVISOR

NRDC-ITA AND NRF 18: RATIONALE FOR A STRATCOM FRAMEWORK RELATED TO SOUTH

Whereas attacks against Crimea and Ukraine resulted in the Alliance taking actions to enhance its capacity to assume deterrence and collective defense towards the Eastern flank, new challenges and threats, ranging from state and non-state actors, in a conventional, asymmetric or hybrid way have emerged from the Southern flank of the Alliance.

This new paradigm has led NATO posture and capacity to be adapted in order to provide a 360-degree protection of Alliance territory.

Fulfilling its stand-by role as LCC for NRF 18, from January to December 18, and while being committed "*all inclusive*" to defend NATO members, NRDC-ITA has recognized the need to focus on South by drafting a dedicated STRATCOM framework.

Which are the risks related to this direction? What is at stake for NATO members? What are the opportunities offered by a dedicated Strategic Communications framework? Those are some of the questions this article will try to answer.

For many years now, the security situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has deteriorated, leading the terrorist threat to reach an unprecedented level of intensity, particularly in the form of terrorist attacks into Allied territory. The recent defeat of ISIS in both Iraq and Syria should not divert NATO members from the risks represented by this entity. It is able to resuscitate either differently or elsewhere and ready to continue the fight in the virtual caliphate, inspiring terrorist lone wolves in our countries. This situation has also contributed to feed a massive outflow of migrants towards Europe, while offering opportunities for weapon proliferation… a windfall for traffickers including terrorist groups. Finally, Russia's military intervention in Syria and its naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean also have implications for the Alliance in the region.

In this context, the capability of NATO to assure Alliance members' collective defense remains a key goal. NATO should more than ever demonstrate its capacity to strengthen deterrence and defense against this threat, to project stability beyond its borders, and to safeguard universal values of freedom, peace, human rights and democracy.

Related to these capacities, NATO ability to win the battle of perceptions is at stake. Not only should potential enemies be convinced of NATO resolve and ability to protect Alliance territory and counter their propaganda, but our home audiences should also recognize NATO as the ultimate guarantor of freedom and security. For that sake, Strategic Communications remains at the heart of the successful conduct of missions and operations by the Alliance.

Constantly adapting and ready to face new challenges in the security environment, in full support of NATO core tasks and values, NRDC-ITA has therefore identified the need to issue a STRATCOM framework dedicated to direction South.

Through aligning vertical messaging and narrative from the highest level down to the tactical level and providing further guidance, this document could offer many opportunities for all NRDC-ITA communication and engagement activities during 2018 and beyond.

Thus, NRDC-ITA staff and communicators would actively support NATO's aims and COM NRDC ITA's intent by pursuing the following related STRATCOM objectives:

(a) contribute to continuous and effective information collection, management and sharing among relevant NATO actors and partners;

(b) develop a comprehensive understanding and situational awareness in the South aimed at monitoring and assessing threats, challenges and opportunities from this direction;

(c) contribute to the identification and prevention of hostile disinformation and propaganda activity in order to help manage and counter their effects on home audiences;

(d)   promote NRDC-ITA capacity, will and readiness to anticipate and respond to threats and challenges emanating from the South;

(e)   contribute to enhance NATO's ability to project stability through regional partnerships as directed;

(f)   seek dedicated partnership with NATO, international actors and NGOs sharing the same concerns about the situation in the MENA area.

(g)   contribute to promote the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Whether it is awareness & anticipation, capability and adaptation, commitment, deterrence & defense, partnership, transparency & credibility or values and value, the themes supporting this STRATCOM framework would contribute to enhance NRDC-ITA readiness to fulfil its NRF18 tasks.
This undoubtedly demonstrates the value of such a document, which also contributes to making the NRDC-ITA motto *"Everywhere Rapidly"* a reality.

LTC. COL. **Andy P. MOSS** [GBR-A] HQ NRDC-ITA– SO1 J4 Current Ops
MAJ. **Paola GORI** [ITA-A] HQ NEDC-ITA– SO J4 Supply Class I / Class II

BRLR17, A WAY TO TEST THE eNRF LOGISTIC CONCEPT

What did we learn from Exercise Brilliant Ledger 17 and the Support Division Seminar 17 in developing and refining the "NATO RESPONSE FORCE 2018 Logistic Concept"?

NRDC-Italy was evaluated and certified by LANDCOM in late 2017 and from 1st of January 2018 the Headquarters assumed the position of stand-by NATO Response Force-Land Component Command (NRF-LCC) for one year. In the Commander's Vision and Direction 2018-2020, the NRDC-ITA Commander, Lieutenant General Roberto Perretti, highlighted how "NATO is adapting rapidly to contend with the current and emerging threats stemming from our eastern and southern flanks" and how he wish "this Headquarters (HQ) to progress other the next number of years".

After decades of Brigade centric counter-insurgency and peace support operations, having dismantled and disinvested in the structures and mind-sets that previously supported Collective Defence at scale, using Units that may not have been identified prior to mobilisation, in roles that they have not practised on the ground with partners they have never met, the *Exercise Brilliant Ledger 17* represented a new challenge to an inherently multinational force over long lines of communication.

The task facing the NRDC-ITA logisticians in *NATO Response Force 18* is a sizable one. In the absence of large logistic maneuvers to hone deployment and sustainment skills, the Support Division logisticians have had to rely on a series of seminars and Command Post Exercises (CPXs) to better develop their role in 2018, outlining where they stand after the latest iterations of our *NRF 18* preparation: the Support Division Seminar and Exercise Brilliant Ledger.

NRDC-ITA evaluation design

On 12th October 2017, in Bellinzago Novarese (Novara) Italy, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Italy successfully completed the exercise *Brilliant Ledger 2017*, the most important training event of the Headquarters in 2017 and was certified by NATO as a Land Component Command (LCC) for eNRF 2018, the *enhanced NATO Response Force*. That was the final step in the preparation for being committed as part of the eNRF for the stand-by period from January 2018. This task includes Command and Control (C2) structures over the Land Forces of the *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force* (VJTF), whose task is to provide an immediate NATO response to possible threats, being on a very short "*notice to move*".

The Support Division Seminar, on 5th an 6th December 2017, is the annual meeting which represents not only an outstanding forum for exchanging new initiatives, lessons identified and lessons learned, but also two days of lectures, briefings and discussions on the NRF Support Concept.

Ex Brilliant Ledger 17 Lessons Learned

The G4 Branch, along with the rest of Support Division, comprehensively answered the questions posed by the Combat Readiness Evaluation team (CREVAL). They were able to show processes coherent with NATO doctrine, an understanding of the Land Component Command (LCC) and local initiatives that improved their ability.

However the exercise was a Command Post Exercise, whilst at times demanding, it could not faithfully replicate the stresses and friction of real time operations, nor could small Lower Controls (LOCONs) generate the same sort of information flow that fully-fledged Brigade and unit headquarters undoubtedly can. Furthermore, the exercise was a test of inputs, processes and procedures. It did not assess the quality of the output. Were our plans properly communicated to the lowest levels and would they really have worked in that scenario? Given the limitations of the exercise, the G4 Branch came away with a number of key conclusions. Firstly there is a tendency to skim over the detail when Command Post exercising. Unit movements were faithfully played on *Coalition Reception Staging Onward Movement* (CORSOM), but the frictions inherent in moving large formations cannot be easily replicated. Furthermore, the Branch contains a broad range of nationalities, each with differing doctrines, has imposed to harness them and the G4 Branch will compile a revised logistic portion to the staff estimate handbook. This will provide updated planning yardsticks. The compilation of yardsticks will be aided by strengthened cooperation with and understanding of our subordinate formations; this process continues with a visit to the "Ariete" Brigade in January.

Secondly, the Branch continues to struggle with the complexities of multinational logistic C2 in a complex, dynamic environment. Brilliant Ledger 17 exercised the Rear Headquarters concept and allowed Support Division to explore the concept further. The problem of rear area C2 and the parallel command of logistic depth units is one that is exercising a number of our fellow HQs. The G4 answer to the problem is a non-doctrinal response to tackle the issues of C2 for the rear area, gearing between a Three Stars Headquarters and Units in the Forward Support Group (FSG) and the ability to operate over long distances. It is a novel solution and still requires much care and attention to understand fully the roles and responsibilities between the Main HQ G4 Branch and the subordinate Rear HQ. It will be no surprise that this will be a focus area for our internal training over the next few months.

Support Division Seminar 17 Lessons Learned

The Seminar was a well-attended gathering that enabled us to refine our understanding of the context in which we could deploy as an NATO Response Force LCC HQ. Discussions with Higher, flanking and subordinate formations highlighted the following:

– The need for flexibility and agility as our C2 relationships up, down and laterally change frequently as a theatre matures.

– The need for innovative structures, infused with mission command, to deal with immature C2 structures in the early part of an operation.

– The need to be prepared to fight through

inertia and bureaucracy caused by the lack of a fully enabled Area of Operations.

The need for absolute precision in our deployment plans.

Chaired by NRDC-ITA Deputy Chief of Staff Support, this annual meeting, as addressed by the DCOS SPT during his closing remarks, played his main role as "*an outstanding forum for exchanging new initiatives, lessons identified, lessons learned and an opportunity to achieve and accomplish the sharing knowledge and expertise. A point of reference and added value, for the teambuilding, that requires maintaining a high degree of professionalism and the capacity to integrate G4 Staff effectively, within the Support Division*".

NRDC-ITA Deputy Commander, Maj. General Sir Edward Alexander Smyth-Osbourne, closed the seminar highlighting that "*the "NRF Support Concept Review" gave a clear evidence of continuing hard work*", but in his opinion three things were evident, in particular "*this is a need for ongoing work to develop the plan and to continue to improve the Logistic Support and*

the focus must be on looking for solutions rather than listing problems". However "*the problems are broad and varied, and in many cases the solutions lie beyond this Headquarters. Coping with these issues will require flexibility*". The Lessons Learned showed "*we need to really focus to "Reception, Staging, Onward Movement" (RSOM) and on Force Projection in an environment where national restrictions to movement remain in place*".

Conclusions

"*Exercise Brilliant Ledger 17*" and the "*Support Division Seminar 17*" confirmed NRDC-ITA's attention on demanding issues, in particular both activities clearly demonstrate how much is important within NATO the training and the exercises in order to increase and promote the role of the Alliance. On the other hand these experiences provided an opportunity to analyze and evaluate common challenges, an opportunity to debate one more time the results the Support Division achieved year by year, not only from a professional point of view but also an occasion to show the importance of teamwork and how NRDC-ITA's framework adds value.

"NATO faces considerable challenges and complex adaptation. We exist and operate within this sphere, and therefore we must understand it and act in an agile and responsive manner. We must continue to build on the good work of previous years, developing and enhancing our capabilities. We will continue thinking, training and exercising to proper grades of complexity in consideration of our commitment as NRF LCC, this is critical since we are honest about our intentions and ambitions. Whatever role and mission we will undertake, we must sponsor a joint mindset and streamline our interoperability with our affiliated units. We will pass our best practices to other NATO entities while recognizing areas we may improve within our organization.
We must continuously develop and improve our skills and ensure they are appropriately maintained through a robust and challenging training program".

Lieutenant General Roberto Perretti, NRDC-ITA Commander.

CAPT. **Giuseppe SARDELLA** [ITA-A] HQ NRDC-ITA - SO J6 STRATSYS (A)

NRDC-ITA COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS WITHIN LCC FRAMEWORK

As a collection of Nations across the globe, the members of NATO face a unique challenge during any exercise or operation: communication technology. As the NATO mission set has expanded, its Units need to become quicker and more adaptable to the changing world. Whether spoken word or digital communications, clear communication between NATO Nations and their various military branches is vital to their success.

The NRDC-ITA is one of NATO's High Readiness Forces on the forefront of that quick adaptability, which has been certified, during Ex "Brilliant Ledger" 17, as the *NATO Response Force Land Component Command* for 2018. In particular, that exercise links the NRDC-ITA to the *Joint Force Command* (JFC) Brunssum in the Netherlands, to an *Air Component Command* (AIRCOM) in Germany and to a *Maritime Component Command* (MARCOM) in Spain, showing how relevant is the role of a robust and efficient *Communications and Information Systems* (CIS), always being able to satisfy the principles of providing adequate capacity, resilience and redundancy.

For this reason the overall CIS concept is designed to support the most demanding mission of NRDC-ITA deploying on a large scale, high-intensity, war-fighting operation, in particular when it is ready to deploy as a Land Component Command for Joint Operations under NATO, EU or a coalition command, to conduct or sustain missions throughout the operational

spectrum, both within and beyond NATO's Area of Responsibility for the collective defence of Alliance territory.

As a result within a Nato Response Force scenario, NRDC-ITA has the capability to deploy a *Tactical Area Communication System* to keep connected all its embedded Command Posts and to provide connectivity to three subordinates Brigades (one of these is the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) as well as to Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units, and also to a Divisional Headquarters.

This demanding capability is granted and enhanced by the Support Brigade through the 1st Signal Regiment, one of the most well trained and equipped unit of the Italian Army. It is based on the following constituent elements:

Communication Network

The primary communication network is provided through the use of multi-channel satellite ground stations. A variety of equipments are provided by 1st Signal Regiment with different bandwidth and satellite bands. The secondary communication network consists of high capacity, multi-channel *Direct Line of Sight* (DLOS) radios, which connect CIS nodes within the tactical Area of Responsability (subject to terrain constraints), and create a meshed, switched network using "Trunk Nodes" where necessary, and "Radio Relays" to provide range extension.

Information System Infrastructure

The Information System Infrastructure supports three distinct security domains in order to be able to provide core and functional services for NATO users and MISSION partners. Currently, these domains include a NATO SECRET *Wide Area Network* (WAN), a Mission Network WAN, and a NATO UNCLASSIFIED WAN (connected to the Internet).

Voice Network

The telephone network is capable of interfacing to the NATO Core Network, the *Italian Military Telephone Network* (SOTRIN) and to the other nation military and civil networks as required. In addition, secure *Voice Over IP* (VOIP) is also available through a CISCO Voice manager hosted on the CIS network.

Combat Radio Network

NRDC-ITA maintains secure and unsecure UHF TACSAT, HF and VHF radios to provide redundancy and alternate communications.

The road that led to today Communication and Information System landscape draws its origin from the *NATO International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, with the *Afghanistan Mission Network* (AMN), where all of the separate Nations connected their systems together. It was a technical and procedural template for people knowing what a safe system looks like.
As soon as ISAF mission finished, the AMN was deactivated but all the Nations within NATO wanted this framework to continue and to endure for future contingent operations. This network was made into what is called the *Federated Mission Network* (FMN). With the FMN, NATO has been able to connect 28 Nations, regardless of location. For the NRDC-ITA's NRF mission in 2018 as the LCC, the HQ could be responsible for several Units spanning military services and NATO Nations, the interoperability of communications is even more crucial.

New demanding NATO operational concepts dictate the capability of providing rapidly interoperable and deployable CIS assets, a new catalogue of smart IT services and appropriate Command&Control arrangements. NATO Commanders need a single identical display of relevant operational information shared by more than one Command Post.

In short, they require a system able to provide an appropriate Common Operational Picture summarizing information such as position of own and enemy troops, position and status of important infrastructures (such as bridges and roads) in a single framework guaranteeing a clear battle-space situational awareness. The Italian National version of this innovative system, capable of providing a detailed Common Operational Picure, is the C2I Advanced, which has been certified by NATO, to be used on its highly secure military networks.

For NRF 18, NRDC-ITA expects its Staff to be able to turn up with systems that can connect together on operations; information, planning and execution documents that will be produced by the Land Component Command will be constantly updated, so rather than everybody having to send things by email or chat, it will be directly available through NRDC-ITA high performance Functional Services hosted on the various systems and domains. It's very effective collaboration and it means everyone's got one version of the truth.

By timely refining its CIS capability, NRDC-ITA will be proactively ready to meet any challenge it might face during the NRF 2018 standby period. Once more, resiliency and redundancy of communication systems has proved to be crucial to the achievement of relevant goals and Mission accomplishment.

SIACCON LAND C2 SYSTEMS
ICC AIR C2 SYSTEMS
MCCIS MARITIME C2 SYSTEMS
FASs (Targeting, Planning, Logistics)
C2I
Common Operational Picture
Command & Control
Situational Awareness

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MAJ. **Ben IRWIN-CLARK** [GBR-A] - SO INFLUENCE COORD

"PRACTISING INFLUENCE" IMPROVING THE WAY NRDC-ITA INFLUENCE DIVISION IS EXERCISED

Since the middle of 2017 the NRDC-ITA Influence Division has been engaged in an ambitious project to refine the HQ's processes to generate and deliver exercises that reflect realistic influence activity lead times and requirements and improve exercise design to allow influence to be better practised. In this article we will share the "*best practice*" lessons identified, for the benefit of others.

An initial study by the Influence Division of what needed to be done produced the following observations and suggestions:

a) **The exercise scenario is adjusted**.
An Influence Division representative should be included in the *Crisis Situation Update* (CSU) writing team, and as the link for involvement by the Influence Division's Branch subject matter experts in drafting CSUs. The Influence Division recognised the requirement for the scenario to include pre- and post-execution phase activity, so that influence outputs could be better demonstrated within the execution phase.

b) **Influence Division considerations and lead times to be better understood**.
It was recognised that the level of understanding of influence objectives and their practical application was low across the HQ, and that steps needed to be taken to address this.

c) An "*Influence Concept*" for each operation should be created and adopted early in each exercise.
Without this, understanding of the Influence Division involvement in the exercise is poor, and direction and guidance of its Branches by the Influence Division lacks clarity.

Once these observations and suggestions were identified, the Influence Division began to take action accordingly, making a greater contribu-

If you want NRDC-ITA exercises to better reflect realistic Influence considerations, you need:

1. An early Influence Concept

2. A scenario that reflects the information domain before, during and after the phase

3. MEL/MIL injects that test the Influence Division and trigger influence staff processes

4. Proactive and flexible Influence Division Branches

5. Post-phase Assessment

Fig. 1: How the Influence Division summed up its initial findings

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tion to the creation of the exercise scenario for Ex "Brilliant Ledger" 2017 (Ex BRLR 17) than in previous exercises. This was achieved through active engagement with the Scenario Manager over the CSUs, which resulted in an increased appetite for information domain-related content, and coordination of Branch SMEs inputs. The result was CSUs which included realistic and relevant content for practitioners of influence to analyse and plan against.

In addition, G2 created "enemy forces" *High Value Individual* (HVI) packs, and built the enemy picture to include enemy influence activities and an enemy StratCom narrative, with Influence Division assistance. These improved the depth of the scenario further. The Influence Division and G7 together undertook to create MEL/MIL materials for inclusion in the exercise which were numerous, realistic and testing.

By conducting a detailed study of the types of MEL/MIL incidents required and briefing all Branch SMEs and those with responsibility for creating MEL/MIL incidents and injects, Branches were ensured of appropriate challenges during the execution phase, which fitted into the general picture of the overall scenario.

One of the key issues identified by the Influence Division was that influence considerations, the information domain and the lead times necessary to achieve influence in an operation were not well or widely understood across the HQ prior to Ex BRLR 17. In order to counter this, the Influence Division provided detailed briefing

and explanation to the Command Group, conducted meetings seeking to improve working practices and processes with the Operations Division's Branches, to follow on from earlier work in this regard, and robustly explained the role and the outputs of the Division throughout the MEL/MIL process, Crisis Response Planning and Execution. Another major improvement for the HQ's ability to exercise in the information domain was made with the inclusion of "28th (Pavia) PSYOPS" Regiment's provision of an exercise Social Media environment. Developed in coordination with the INFO OPS and PAO Branches, this allowed Influence Division Branches deployed on the exercise to be tested in a more realistic information domain, with generated "Fakebook" activity and tweets that could be analysed and reacted to.

During Ex BRLR 17 efforts were made to improve the way influence effects are measured and assessed, by the creation of an Influence Division combined *Measures of Performance* (MoPs) and *Measures of Effectiveness* (MoEs) table, which included all the influence effects to be achieved and supporting Branch actions/tasks. This was included in the HQ's Operational Assessment (OA) Branch processes and used to more accurately assess the effectiveness of the HQ's influence activities.

The most significant improvement made by the Influence Division during Ex BRLR 17 was the *Influence Concept* to bridge the HQ's StratCom narrative for the operation and the COM's intent, and provide direction and guidance on how the

Fig.3: The ExBRLR17 Influence Concept.

HQ should seek to influence target audiences. The creation of this concept early in planning, and its subsequent explanation to and use by the *Operational Planning Group* (OPG) and *Operational Refinement Group* (ORG) resulted in a coordinated and synchronised influence effort.

The changes made by the Influence Division for the conduct of Ex BRLR 17 made it the most realistic and testing exercise for the HQ's StratCom and Influence-related elements so far, but there is more that can and continues to be done. While contribution from the Influence Division

to the exercise scenario was an improvement on previous exercises, in subsequent exercises it should be possible to increase and improve this contribution a great deal. While an Influence Division representative was nominally included in the CSU scripting team, in reality this did not amount to any face to face discussion or drafting, and Influence Division Branch SMEs' contributions could have been much more thorough and detailed. In future exercises the opportunity will be taken to build the "before time" information domain picture for the exercise, including influence attempted or achieved by the HQ prior to the execution phase.

- Execution Phase of Ex BRLR starts on Day G+94. Scenario (through Crisis Situation Updates) must reflect 93 days' worth of influence activity, info domain situation and changes/trends.

Fig. 2: An example of the work done to identify the MEL/MIL incidents required in order to test the Influence Division's intended outputs best

Fig.4: From Influence Division Brief on Improving Exercises, dated 5 Apr 17

While the CPOE for Ex BRLR 17 was excellent, and included input from Influence Division Branch SMEs, it could benefit from more Influence Division involvement in its inception. COS NRDC-ITA briefed the Influence Division on his vision for a form of "library" of HVI packs, analysis of the information domain, tribe/ethnicity/key leader analysis, and other materials which could be used for all exercises, tailored to the scenario.

The Influence Division is developing this for the future. The social media environment is an area of exciting potential for NRDC-ITA. The augmented social media environment for Ex BRLR 17 was very limited, and switched off after only a few days. It was also only viewable by selected

the number of MEL/MIL incidents and injects is also an area for potential development. While planned and dynamic MEL/MIL injects do provide a number of information domain (and therefore influence) challenges, in order to be realistic there needs to be far more content (i.e number of tweets, posts, media pieces), and an equal or greater amount of information domain MEL/MIL content as there is manoeuvre activity. Currently there is not enough to keep the Influence Division Branches working at a realistic operational tempo. The Influence Division suggested a model for the EXCON daily execution plan or *Main Events List* (MEL), which would see an equal or greater number of information domain actions as in the manoeuvre realm.


Day/Phase # **GROUND SITUATION**	Day/Phase # **INFO DOMAIN SITUATION**
MAP (red diamonds and squares)	Media stories
FF DISPOSITIONS	Enemy perception
EN DISPOSITIONS	Local population perception
MEL/MIL INCIDENTS	International/Regional perception
MEL/MIL EVENTS	MEL/MIL Key Influence considerations for Assessment

These 2 complementing sides of the exercise scenario and execution phase battle picture would force the HQ to react with manoeuvre activity **and influence activity**

Fig.5: From Influence Division Briefing on Improving Exercises, dated 5 April 2017

for influence paragraphs. The early creation and briefing into the plan development of the Influence Concept made it much easier to explain influence considerations to all HQ personnel, and get the staff all pulling in the same direction to influence the target audiences. This concept could then be adjusted and improved as planning continued, and used as the basis for DCOS Influence's direction and guidance to Branches for planning for subsequent phases. The Influence Division was able to make significant steps forward in improving the way it is exercised, and the way influence is built into NRDC-ITA exercises in general, before and during Ex BRLR 17. Above are just the most notable of the lessons identified during this process, in hopes that they will prove useful in further improving future exercises both within NRDC-ITA and elsewhere.

individuals within the HQ, and managed by "28th (Pavia) PSYOPS" Regiment not by EXCON, so some of the content did not match the scenario well. In future there is potential for a much larger platform, with interaction across the HQ managed by a HQ Social Media Branch. This will allow the exercise of content and sentiment analysis with software new to the HQ, and the use of social media as an influence tool.

Measuring the effectiveness of Influence is one of the hardest and most perennial problems of any non-kinetic military outputs. Now that the Influence Division has created a master MoEs table for an exercise, the next step will be to utilise it properly for assessing influence outcomes. This means getting Influence Division MoEs properly incorporated into the HQ Assessment process and exercising collection against each MoE, developing and enhancing them as we progress. For future exercises an increase in

Over all, the work on improving the way the Influence Division is exercised has achieved significant success so far. Compared with previous exercises, the scenario for Ex BRLR 17 was considerably more realistic and included useful background about the information domain and influence activities already being conducted by all sides in the crisis. This provided material for Influence Division branches to analyse and exploit for planning purposes. Once the Influence Concept and CRP were complete, the detailed study of what types of MEL/MIL incidents were required in order to test and exercise each intended influence activity or task was well worth doing, and will be done for every exercise.

On Ex BRLR 17 a broader understanding of influence was achieved across the HQ. As an example, Influence Division planners were included in all planning activities without asking, and space was left in CONPLANs and FragOs

COL. **Richard SMITH** [GBR-A] - ACOS JFIRES

A CENTRALISED POINT OF AUTHORITY FOR JOINT FIRES INTEGRATION

The Joint Fire Support Element Challenge

"The Joint Fire Support Element is the single point of contact for Joint Fire Support coordination at all levels. It coordinates national and multinational reconnaissance assets, delivery systems from artillery, infantry, army aviation, air forces and naval forces contributing to Joint Fire Support"

During a series of Italian Defense General Staff sponsored exercises conducted in Autumn 2016 aimed at training NRDC-ITA HQ to synchronize and conduct, high intensity, peer-on-peer warfighting operations in a joint environment as an LCC HQ, it became apparent that there were a number of deficiencies in the organization and procedures that would allow the HQ to effectively conduct Joint Fire Support (JFS) at increased tempo. In particular was our ability to integrate and to coordinate accurate, sequenced and safe land and air fires into the close and deep battlespace.

Considering this problem across the HQ, and utilizing the Lessons Learned Process, the recommended, and Commander endorsed, 'solution' was to formally adopt the establishment of a Joint Fire Support Element (JFSE) acting, as the doctrine tells us above, as: *a single point of contact for Joint Fire Support, de-confliction and coordination.*


Fig 1. Roles and Responsibilities of the JFSE.

NATO Fire Support Doctrine describes in detail the capabilities and structure of the JFSE. It can exist at every level of command from Company to Corps and must interact closely both with the Commander and with the other cells, sections or tactical groupings of the force. The JFSE will range from a small Fire Support Team at the Company level through to a combined and joint, multi-cell structure at the 3* level. But, the fundamental roles and responsibilities of a JFSE are the same: to be capable of employing, coordinating, integrating, and deconflicting multi-national land, air, and if in range and available, maritime fire support. The JFSE will provide this gamut of joint fires to the relevant land commander (from Company to Corps Commander) for use in his designated battlespace in order to support his mission, intent and manoeuvre plan; it will shape, possibly decisively, the deep battle and support the close.

ement of a 'Coordinating Altitude' between LCC and ACC airspace and then the ability at each level of command, LCC to Company (*"from JFAC to JTAC"*), to 'own' battlespace and deconflict surface to surface fires from aircraft and other airspace users (Aviation, UAV, etc).

Dynamic procedures (doing it in 'real time' in a dynamic and fluid situation with an enemy that has a vote) becomes far more challenging – especially when employing low level Close Air Support. There is still work to be done to achieve full Dynamic Procedural Control and meet the operating requirements of the JFAC and this remains a work in progress across the NCS. The solution NRDC-ITA's AOCC is adopting is to continue to work on the concept of an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). An ASOC is defined as 'the primary control agency for execution of airpower in direct support of land operations' and is designed to enhance air

Fig 2 – JFSE Composition.

The biggest challenge the JFSE faces is conducting non-fratricidal fires in a congested battlespace. De-conflicting fires offers a solution – separating aircraft and surface to surface fires by time and space. But to fully exploit the full capability fires should be integrated and concentrated (the artilleryman's old adage that one should "thump [a target with fire] rather than dribble [rounds onto it]"). Deconfliction and integration of airspace can be achieved through a number of pre-planned and procedural Battlespace Control Measures. This is a large topic in itself but the fundamental principle is the agre-

land integration in an LCC headquarters. Airmen from the Deployable Air Command and Control Centre (DACC) will augment the existing AOCC representative in the NRDC-ITA operations center where they can then dynamically re-task air component aircraft in the LCC battlespace. Adoption of the ASOC concept would enhance the advice NRDC-ITA HQ receives on the current air situation as well as further contributing to the collection, prioritization, pace and processing of air support requests. In turn this will assist with the production and delivery to the air component of inputs into the air tasking order.

Courtesy of Italian Army.

Implementing JFSE within NRDC-ITA

The structure and the functions of the JFSE within NRDC-ITA HQ will only be implemented when the HQ is deployed for exercises or operations at its Crisis Establishment. With its manning and structure, the wider HQ and in particular the JFIRES Branch is not organized to implement the JFSE concept at Peacetime Establishment.

JFSE – Structure, Roles and Composition

The JFSE is however structured around the Peace Establishment of the existing JFIRES and AIR branches of NRDC-ITA HQ. On deployment or activation the JFSE is broken down into a number of subordinate cells as follows:

(1) **Command and Plans.** ACOS JFIRES will normally command the JFSE from his designated branch area in the deployed HQ. With a small plans staff he will keep the Commander and the principle DCOS and ACOSs fully informed of JFSE activity as well as receiving their direction and guidance through the established battle rhythm process or at ad hoc meetings or boards.

(2) **Ops Cell:** Based in the OPSCEN the cell oversees the successful completion of pre-determined and pre-planned JFSE tasks as well as reacting to the dynamic real time battle. The JFSE Ops Cell will work closely with the units or formations that are either attached or directed to support NRDC-ITA. The Ops Cell coordinates dynamic mission planning and battlespace management with the wider OPSCEN.

(3) **Artillery Cell**: This may be a part of the existing Ops Cell or if an Artillery Brigade is Task Organised to NRDC-ITA it will command and control artillery employment throughout the area of operations. If the Brigade Commander deploys there are options for his employment:

   a. He remains with his own HQ, deploys separately from the main NRDC-ITA HQ and commands the artillery units of his Brigade.

   b. His HQ is incorporated into NRDC-ITA HQ and he becomes the JFSE Commander and the principal JFIRES advisor to COM NRDC-ITA. The relationship between Artillery Brigade Commander and ACOS JFIRES is thus a very important one, and must be developed throughout exercises and routine business.

(4) **Air Ops Support (AOS) Cell**: The cell will provide and maintain communications with Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) and controls allocated airborne weapons systems via the JFAC; the key here is a seamless link.

(5) **Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) Cell**: will establish and maintain communications with the Maritime Component Command (MCC) and coordinates employment of sea-based JFS weapon systems with other JFS weapon systems.

(6) **Attack Aviation Cell:** Drawn from the G3 Air branch this cell will plan and oversee the execution of attack aviation operations.

(7) **Airspace Management Cell.** The Cell, when agreed and established would offer NRDC-ITA HQ a dynamic airspace control capability.

Conclusion

The establishment of a JFSE in NRDC-ITA HQ is an important step on the conceptual and developmental path that has taken the HQ away from COIN and Peace Support Operations to being a fully effective HQ capable of, and focused on, warfighting at the Corps level. It represents the most effective structure to achieve the mission results the Commander demands when in a complex environment where resources will most likely be constrained. It will integrate various joint fires staff functions together which in turn will exploit joint capabilities to the full.

This creation of a JFSE, thus far, has been principally driven through doctrinal references and staff agreements. The next step is to fully exercise in this configuration against a demanding scenario which will test the resilience of the concept and the processes. It has been developed through close cooperation with the Italian Army as the Framework Nation. In this way, the JFSE concept could also represent a useful example for the adoption of the same structures across the Italian Armed Forces from Divisional HQ downwards. The Italian Army Artillery HQ and the affiliated Brigade HQ and it's regiments, that contributed at the definition stage of this work, is now further reinforced with the need to carefully select and train those people set to fill these appointments and roles.

All NATO High Readiness Forces (Land) HQs are, it is suggested, dealing with the same challenges of cycling through JTF, LCC and Corps and, with their Framework Nations support, are adapting structures and operating tools (SOP, SOI, TTP etc) in order to ease the transition and build resilience. We do not have a unique solution to this problem but one that is enshrined in doctrine and is already used by a number of nations in different guises. We are now looking forward to fully establishing and operating the JFSE, taking it from theory to practice and to being a real entity in the HQ fulfilling an important part of the overall functional structure.

Courtesy of US Navy.

LTC. COL. **Athanasios FOURTOUNAS** [GRE-A] HQ NRDC-ITA, JLSG OPS

INTEGRATING RISK MANAGEMENT IN LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

Be risk aware, not risk averse!

Volumes have been written on the causes of failure in military operations all over the world, surveys and studies have been done over the years and many fingers are pointing in every direction—a couple of these fingers are pointing straight at us, the Army Logisticians!

Nowadays, logistics operations are conducted in a complex multidimensional environment, and one of the most significant challenges is to deliver the proper logistic services at the right place and in the right time, but also at minimum cost when it comes to resources. To be a successful logistician you must act proactively, by integrating Risk Management culture and procedures not only into planning process, but also into the execution phase!

Be risk aware, not risk averse!

Getting used to the transparency of a risk management framework is the first stepping stone in integrating an effective Risk Culture. Being risk aware rather than risk averse will demonstrate commitment to due diligent operational practices and allow the logistic tasks to grow through the engagement of each soldier.
Having an accurate risk profile for each logistic task and a consolidated picture of principal risks, creates a valuable opportunity to reconnect with your operational environment, build trust amongst people, improve decision-making and assure transparency for stakeholders.

Identify your Stakeholders

We live in a world of dynamic change, with numerous Stakeholders. A stakeholder is the person or the entity that is influenced or can influence the logistic projects. The first step is to thoroughly study all orders and mission environment to identify internal and external stakeholders (positive, negative or neutral) and proceed with their analysis. The analysis focuses on two principal factors:

1. Stakeholders' Interest on the project

2. Stakeholders' Power to Influence the project

A typical logistics system includes many Stakeholders ranging from local contractors, NFIUs, NSEs (& their capabilities) to local population (& its support) etc. The end of this first process is to produce a detailed stakeholder register where the profile of each stakeholder is depicted. This will serve as a critical input to the next face "Identify Risks".

Risk Identification

By definition, Risk Management aims to increase the probability and/or impact of positive events and decrease the probability and/or impact of negative events. By breaking-down the abovementioned definition, we derive to the following statements:

1. A Risk can either be an Opportunity (positive) or a Threat (negative)

2. A risk could be stated as a two-dimensional factor, formed by Probability and Impact (over the project objectives: Scope, Time, Cost, Quality)

In the "Identify Risks" phase every internal and external entity must participate. "End Users", that are usually the subordinate units, should not be omitted, so as to have a 360 approach. Any event that could positively and/or negatively impact Logistic Operations must be included, e.g.:

- Supply chain interruptions

- Accidents with victims including soldiers and/or civilians

- Major force events

- Loss of or damage to critical infrastructure

- Appropriate infrastructures (airports, ports or railways) of Host Nation

- Adequate geographical location of infrastructures of Host Nation

- Local population support and provision of supplies from Host Nation without charge

As Logistics reliability is threatened by many internal and external factors, this phase takes more time than any other Risk process so as to be able to reach a comprehensive situational awareness through the exchange of information. To succeed that, various Identification tools and techniques must be used in a combined way through several Facilitated Workshops and Focus Groups. Examples of such tools and techniques are Brainstorming and Delphi technique with SMEs along with Affinity diagrams, SWOT analysis followed by Pre-mortem technique, Flowcharts or Influence Diagrams as well as studying "Lessons Learned" from experiences of HQs already engaged in past deployments. A basic template/artifact for this process is the Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS) presented in picture 4 where basic categories of risks are depicted and must be decomposed through analytical and deductive reasoning.

At the end, a Risk Register is produced filled with numerous Opportunities and Threats, written in a Cause-Risk-Effect format so as to allow the analysts and decision makers to be aware of the cause as well as the possible effects of each risk.

Example of an Opportunity, expressed in a Cause-Risk-Effect format, can be:

"Develop relationships with non-NATO entities (Cause), will provide us access to additional sources of information and open source material (Risk) to enhance traditional intelligence and material sources of NATO and decrease operating time for logistics operations (Impact)".

On the other hand, an example of an identified Threat can be:

"Due to the low classification of bridges in area A (Cause), there is a risk of transferring supplies in convoys with numerous smallest vehicles (Risk) which may lead to delay in deliveries and security issues during movement (Impact)".

Assessment and Analysis

Next process is to assess and analyze each risk in the risk register, to estimate the probability of occurrence and its impact on the project. A critical point here is to avoid biases (cognitive, motivational, hindsight, anchoring etc.) by assessing the quality of data the estimations were based upon. Furthermore, there should be a precise classification of risks based on Priority and Urgency.
Looking at Opportunities and Threats in only these two dimensions (Probability & Impact), produces a risk profile that is a snapshot in time and it is a subjective quantification at that point in time that places each risk at a specific point on a P.I. (Probability & Impact) Matrix. But to be more precise, the risk profiling must be conducted in four dimensions. The parameters of direction and speed must be added to the previous produced snapshots. During the above estimations, it is essential to compare all the information over a period to see in which direction risks are moving and at what speed they are escalating. Moving away from just *estimating* to *predicting* adds value to the process and it is one step closer to forward-looking risk management.
When Risk Profiling, is done correctly, it highlights, not only the negative side by exposing challenges, but also helps identify hidden opportunities to optimise risks and build a sustainable competitive advantage. Risk profiling is the first step to "looking through the windscreen and not only in the rear-view mirror"; it is proactive in its approach and practice.
Subsequent steps might be to proceed with a quantitative analysis and an overall project risk exposure analysis and decide potential contingency reserves, while taking into consideration principal stakeholders' risk tolerances. Conclusion of a Quantitative Risk Analysis can be for example how our mission can be affected by the relationship between the third-party logistics service providers and us or by increased distances between logistic base and theater of operations and by restricted availability or usability of the Main Supply Routes (MSRs). No matter

which level in the supply network is concerned, both opportunities and threats regarding logistics processes are increasing along with the complexity of the respective system.

Responses to Opportunities and Threats

The high supply and demand uncertainties along the logistics system can lead to high-level operational risks. Popular business measures such as provision of logistics services, outsourcing and strategic alliances also bring new dimensions of risk to logistics systems. There is a variety of response strategies such as Avoid, Mitigate, Transfer for Threats or Exploit, Enhance and Share for Opportunities. The ideal action is to select the appropriate response for a logistic threat and to transform it to a logistic opportunity!

For example, adopting proactive measures by making the structure of logistics and supply chain systems agile, and implementing the "sense and respond" strategy are effective schemes to handle logistic disruptions. In addition, dynamic contingency plans should also be prepared to provide the optimal "response" to these problems in a timely manner. For example, if there is only one operational airfield within the area of operations on which the whole of logistics is dependent, the point of main effort of air defense can only be there, but at the same time we must find or create an alternative one.

Risk control and reporting

In this final process the Risk Team is applying the predefined risk response plans, monitors identified risks, including residual ones, identifies new risks, and evaluates the risk process effectiveness throughout the logistics project to produce also Lessons Learned.

Key benefits are:

1. The efficiency of the risk approach throughout the logistics project life cycle

2. The continuous optimization of risk responses.

Imagine having a formal monthly Risk report produced after an audit inspection or a Risk reassessment meeting. This report under certain circumstances can be 28 days too late! It is necessary to understand that Risk Management is an iterative process that needs a "Risk nervous system" communicating accurate risk information from all points inside the organization (and outside) and having "live" dashboard reporting on systems like LOGFAS or JCHAT. The sooner people know, the better the decisions and the smaller the losses!

Probability	Threats Risk Score = Probability x Impact					Opportunities High (RED) / Med (YEL) / Low (GRN)				
0.90 Very Likely	0.05	0.09	0.18	0.38	0.72	High	High	High	Med	Low
0.70 Likely	0.04	0.07	0.14	0.28	0.56	High	High	Med	Med	Low
0.50 Possible	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.12	0.40	High	High	Med	Low	Low
0.30 Unlikely	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.12	0.24	High	Med	Med	Low	Low
0.10 Very Unlikely	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.08	Med	Low	Low	Low	Low
	0.05	0.10	0.20	0.40	0.80	Very High	High	Med.	Low	Very Low

Example Impact Definitions – May Be Tailored to Each Project Objective
Impact on an Objective (e.g. Cost, Schedule, Scope, Quality)

Epilogue

All professionals in logistics management must be aware that, to achieve success and business continuity, they should consider Risk Management as an intrinsic part of all their actions. It is time to renovate by doing Logistic Risk Assessment Workshops before and during operations and produce Risk profiles which will reduce the surprise factor of risks. Getting Bad News in Good Time is always better than a surprise when it comes to Risk management.

The organizational Risk culture is influenced when soldiers raise Risk implications early in discussions and throughout the decision-making process! All is needed is for each soldier to know the basic Risk management principles, acquire the basic Risk Management skills and use them to evaluate the risks associated with his/her job by acting daily to mitigate/enhance and control risks. Risk Management success lays in embedding an effective Risk Management culture!

LTC. COL. **Giuseppe MENDICINO** [ITA-A] – HQ NRDC-ITA Rear/JLSG SO Intel

REAR AREA SECOPS

Rear Area Operations

Recently, COM NRDC-ITA, appointed COM JLSG HQ to act as COM HQ Rear for the conduct of Rear Operations when NRDC-ITA is employed as LCC or Corps. Rear Operations, as per ATP 3.2.1, are …*"the largely administrative and logistic activities that occur out of contact with adversary forces, that is, behind the area in which close operations are occurring. Rear operations require security, particularly in campaigns involving an asymmetric, unconventional adversary. In non-contiguous and/or non-linear battlespaces (that is, in areas with no identifiable rear area), there is a need to secure the lines of communications and critical centers. Considerations for rear area security will focus on these lines of communications and other areas that are not manned by combat forces"*.

Rear Operations therefore comprise two main activities, Security and Sustaining Operations, but the first is a precondition for successfully conducting the second. This article will focus on such security operations.

Aim of Security Operations

The aim of planning for the conduct of Security Operations in the Rear Area is to:

a. Ensure (and therefore protect) effective C2;

b. Guarantee Freedom of Movement (FoM);

c. React to enemy deep operations;

d. Protect Critical Infrastructures.

In fact the Rear Area is that battlefield sector where conventional enemy forces plan to execute deep operations against Host Nation (HN) Security Forces and Critical Infrastructures to include Land Lines of Communications, Combat Service Support (CSS) formations and Reserve forces. In a Crisis Response Operation (CRO), Rear Areas may become exposed to asymmetric/hybrid threats posed by regular and/or irregular elements (proxy).

Courtesy of "OcchidellaGuerra".

Recent conflicts, additionally, have shown the risk of a combination between conventional and hybrid threats. Therefore, since the planning phase, we have to be prepared for a level threat assumed as follow (source: *US Joint Security Operations in Theatre – Joint Pub. 3-10*):

a. Level I: Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorists, civil disturbances;

b. Level II: Small tactical units, irregular forces (may include significant stand-off weapons threat);

c. Level III: Large tactical force operations, including airborne (or heliborne), amphibious, infiltration, and major air operations.

The manual above didn't refer to CYBER, but nowadays we have to identify this threat as an additional element of Level I.

However command and control of an entire Rear Area may become, in some circumstances, a difficult task to fulfil and missteps can always occur. A clear example was the tremendous experience of the US 507^ Maintenance Coy in 2003 in IRAQ, a logistic unit that, after missing a turn, moved on a wrong MSR to end directly in the hands of the Sunni insurgents. That (IRAQI) Rear Area, should have had, as per initial estimates conducted at the Joint Multinational

training Command of GRAFENWOEHR (GER), a MP Brigade (20 Coys), then reduced at only 3 MP Coys, as later regretted by Col. Teddy SPAIN, the US Officer in charge for such issue.

Then, most often, an adequate Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) in the Rear is not a question of capability, but of resources. If they are enough, it is possible to plan for "Area Defense" assuming that is feasible to monitor and protect the majority of the Rear Area; otherwise it is better to limit the plan for having a good "Mobile Defense" because protective assets can only cope with a limited portion of territory (i.e. the MSRs).

The conduct of Security Operations

The aforementioned three threat levels allow us to identify force protection measures:

a. Level I. The protection against (the activity of) covert agents, sympathizers, terrorists etc. requires the adoption of "static" force protection measures, it means those procedures and means necessary to (automatically) achieve protection for the personnel, convoys, military installations, C2 etc. In practice we are talking about the measures implemented as consequence of the decla-

red Alert State, to include the protection and reaction in case of a CYBER attack.

b. Level II. Against small tactical units (i.e. SOF teams) or irregular forces (proxy, insurgents etc.) it is necessary to plan for the availability of Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for interventions along MSRs in support of ambushed units, otherwise, for any other unexpected threat, it will be necessary to employ own reserves (i.e. to capture/neutralize an enemy/proxy cell).

c. Level III. Against a large tactical force operation normally it is necessary to ask for the intervention of the higher HQ reserve, since it normally does have, among the possible *orientation of employments*, also the one to respond into the Rear Area.

The above steps obviously are in addition to Air Defense, CBRN, ISTAR and Targeting that, in general terms, are granted by higher or adjacent HQs and NATO Agencies.

Comprehensive approach for Security Operations

Since assets in the Rear Area are too specialized in nature and may be limited in quantity (at least so during an Early Entry phase), it is imperative to look at the Rear with the methodology of the broader comprehensive approach and utilize any available *Soft/Smart* instrument of power. The NRDC-ITA "*three pillars*" in fact include not only DCOS Ops and DCOS Support activities, but also DCOS Influence one. Influence provides force multipliers which benefits have to be sought also within the Rear Area. Without considering the (J)Fire support, what is particularly important in the Rear is the Information Campaign led by Public Affair and supported by CIMIC, Key Leader Engagement and PSYOPS to enforce the overall positive perception of NATO and to counter the enemy influence among potential local supporters. Moreover specific engagement activities can be identified in planning phase and later on delegated to the Rear Area Commander, in particular in the sector of HN Homeland Security (for the provision/coordination of national Intelligence and the support of Force Protection) and Logistics (HN Support but also from any Logistic International Stakeholders present in TO). Concerning the *Media,* as well as the support of HQ Main PA is of a paramount importance for the HQ Rear because not only it serves to opportunely portray, within HN/IC, its activities and results, but also serves to counter any extreme adversary propaganda and when is time to mitigate the undesired effects of an incident.

Conclusions

Even in modern battlefields, the Rear Area remains a necessary element of study and consideration as well as the Forward one. Offensive, Defensive and Delaying operations necessitate of a constant unhampered sustainment flow from the Rear. The sustainment relies on a SASE Rear Area and the latter is a combination of synergies between own and indigenous/international forces/actors. This is the reason why at NRDC-ITA we planned to have, since peace time, an already specialized HQ responsible for the conduct of such Rear Operations.

COL. **Fabio ASSO** [ITA-A] HQ NRDC-ITA ACOS G35

THE SYNCHRONISATION OF TACTICAL MANOEUVRE: A KEY FACTOR FOR SUCCESS

Introduction. NRDC-ITA has undertaken four major exercises during its Land Component Command (LCC) HQ training and stand-by year. Throughout, has been stressed the importance of tempo i.e. the ability to quickly and accurately understand a situation, decide what to do, write plans / orders and execute. By achieving a faster tempo than that of the enemy's, the HQ gains the initiative; and is in a position to dictate the pace and direction of the operation. If not, the HQ will be constantly reacting, unable to drive its own agenda.

Tempo is delivered through a well understood, efficient and effective Core Process that connects the four main activities undertaken by the Commander and the Staff, namely;

1. Planning for the future,

2. refining and synchronising plans and orders for the mid term,

3. while executing current operations

4. and assessing progress against the OPLAN. This article proposes that at the tactical level, synchronisation has an increased relevance within the Core Process. This is arguably where

the HQ's Decision Makers and the Staff should focus if the LCC is successfully to execute operations.

The Operating Envronment. To understand the importance of synchronisation it is first necessary to understand the operating environment. As an LCC HQ, NRDC-ITA must be capable of operating in an Art. V, high intensity war fighting scenario. It must be able to survive and operate in austere conditions, in a degraded environment against a peer enemy. In the conduct of such operations, the LCC HQ will seek to secure the Rear and resource the Close Fight. Above all (and arguably the Main Effort), it will focus on the Deep Fight, shaping the battlefield and ensuring subordinate formations win in their engagements.

Why is Synchronisation so Important? It is in this fluid and unpredictable environment that the importance of detailed synchronisation becomes apparent; this final check and adjustment in the days and hours before execution are crucial to success. Changes to the situation must be considered[1] and operations modified accordingly.
More importantly, the synchronisation process ensures that Air assets apportioned to the LCC


Fig 1: The Core Process with LCC Planning Horizons (EXBRLR17)

1   Changes could include enemy or friendly force dispositions, weather, Commander's Direction and Guidance (D&G).

are fully employed and correctly prioritised. The LCC is largely dependent upon the Air Component to deliver much of its long range Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaisance (ISR) and Deep Fires, in addition to Close Air Support (CAS) to subordinate formations.

If conducted successfully, synchronisation will ensure that planned activity for the next 96 hours is correctly resourced and deconflicted in time and space; risks are mitigated and fleeting opportunities are exploited. Maximum use is made of available Air Power.

How is Synchronisation Conducted? The synchronisation of the subsequent 96 hours is conducted daily through a combination of four different meetings.

1. **The daily Tactical Situation Awareness Brief (TSAB)**. This serves to update the Commander on what has taken place during the last 24 hours and what is programmed for the next 96 hours. Key leaders within the HQ and subordinate formations provide their updates with all Staff Officers listening from their work stations. The key outputs from the TSAB are shared situational awareness across the LCC, and the Commander's D&G.

2. **The daily Land Targeting Group (LTG)**. This meeting will synchronise all targeting activity (both lethal and non lethal) throughout the LCC Battle Space. As such, Information Activity, Public Affairs, KLE and PSYOPS branches will contribute. The focus for the LTG will be the shaping of the LCC Deep Fight, synchronizing the engagement of targets (both lethal and non lethal) in the next 96hrs whilst planning effects out to 14 days. Key outputs are target nominations for the Higher HQ, and fire planning within the LCC Battle Space.

3. **The daily Collection Management Board (CMB)** is run by the G2 Collection Manager focused on the next 96hrs. This ensures the effective and efficient use of available intelligence collection assets. Key outputs are the Collection Task List (as an attachment to the Daily FRAGO) and the Collection Request List sent to the Higher HQ.

4. **The Daily Activities Synchronisation Meeting (DASM)** run by the G35 Section within G3 Branch and is focused on the next 96hrs. This meeting gathers the key outputs from the TSAB, Targeting and Collection Boards and works to synchronise all activity

for the next 96hrs, with particular reference to Corps' manoeuvre, fires / influence and support. The DASM will consolidate all Air Support Requests (ASR) and pass to the AOCC[2].

It is a challenging prospect to synchronise all tactical activity for the following four days in a meeting which lasts less than an hour. NRDC ITA has experimented with a number of different techniques from excel spreadsheets to power point slides. The most successful of these techniques has been the use of maps and overlays which visualize the activities being undertaken. Given the time constraints, the meeting is focused on two days in particular:

- Day 1 (Day 11 in Fig 1) which will be the following day's activities. This must be well understood by the OPSCEN members present because it will be for them to ensure successful execution.

- Day 4 (Day 14 in Fig 1) in order to consolidate and prioritise the ASRs in time to feed the Air Tasking Order (ATO).

The final step in the synchronisation process is the hand over to the OPSCEN. The Synchronisation Matrix, having been visualised during the DASM, is talked through with the OPSCEN Director and if necessary, briefed at the evening Shift Change. The Synchronisation Matrix is also sent out in the Daily FRAGO to ensure understanding across the subordinate formations and LCC Troops.

Conclusion. The tactical operating environment is such that plans and orders rarely survive contact with the enemy. This places greater emphasis on the synchronisation element of the Core Process; and this is where the Command Group and the Staff must focus. Through a series of daily meetings, ISR, Fires and Manoeuvre can be resourced and deconflicted in accordance with the changing situation and the Commander's daily D&G. Given the LCC focus on the Deep Fight, and given that most of the Find and Strike will be Air delivered, the synchronisation process ensures that Air Power is prioritised and fully exploited. Finally, as with most activities in a tactical HQ, Power Point will only get you so far. The requirement to study and work off a detailed map remains the main Staff tool.

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THE NEW LIGHT FORWARD HQ AND REACHBACK COMMAND POSTS

During the 20th and 21st centuries, warfare has evolved significantly as we have seen from the variety of conflicts. Technological advances and enemy capability have changed the nature of warfare, with the concomitant requirement for tactics to change.

Conventional warfare seems to have become almost obsolete because of the **nuclear and technical capability** of many nations. **Near peer enemies are evolving the hybrid threat**, which requires a change in mind-set particularly from a defensive perspective.

The tactics currently employed by many Western forces are now **outdated** following years of Asymmetric (or Insurgency) warfare with a technologically inferior enemy; but with a constantly evolving potential threat from a near peer enemy, the thought process requires a change. The battlefield is no longer static, but must remain flexible, mobile and most importantly able to operate in austere conditions.

To adapt to this, NRDC-ITA designed and trialed a new Forward HQ Command Post (CP) capable of meeting the 21st Century challenges. This involves all branches within the HQ, and perhaps most importantly the Support Brigade comprising of Engineers, Support Division and 1st Signal Regiment.

The prior deployments undertaken by this HQ required a large footprint on the ground, both

physical in terms of size and staff, and in Communications Information Systems (CIS); both of which required a significant increase in logistical, technical, and Force Protection manpower. This created a large target for Electronic Warfare and conventional weapons; as well as also a lengthy "build and move" phase.

The plan was to amend the current capability blocks in line with conventional Main and Alternate CPs, but with a modern twist. With current and future technology there is less requirement to put staff at risk, close to the battle. Technological developments and modern communications enhance fast, accurate and most importantly, secure data transfer, allowing a lighter forward deployment, with the bulk of the staff in a safer location.

Enter the REACHBACK HQ: designed for a situation where resources, capabilities and expertise are at a distance from the Area of Operations (AO), providing support for the people in the AO to perform their tasks. A solution designed with all the technological requirements and working areas required to support a distributed Decision Making Process (DMP). The REACHBACK HQ and its staff can support missions anywhere in the world, is unlikely to be targeted by physical weapons, and is secure against EW threats.

"So what", you might ask? This gives several advantages and creates the light Forward CP.

- CPs and the compounds in which they are located in an operational theatre are vulnerable to attack; by using REACHBACK facilities fewer personnel deploy to the AO, so fewer are exposed to attack.

- When a CP has to relocate, fewer people in the AO have to move, meaning the CP can be moved faster and easier, thereby increasing its mobility. The REACHBACK remains in control of operations while the CP moves, and is able to keep the Commander and Staff informed of the situation.

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everywhere rapidly

2 Given that much of the Corps Deep Battle will be fought through AIR delivered munitions, the importance of timely Air Support Requests cannot be overstated.

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everywhere rapidly

30 / #Wearejointandcombined

#Wearejointandcombined / 31

- Because of the newer dynamic and harder-to-predict operations, a CP must be flexible in order to anticipate and react to every situation: However this often requires greater staff capacity. This is easier to achieve in an area outside the HQ. So a REACHBACK may have access to more systems than the Forward HQ.

- Logistically fewer personnel and less materiel are easier to move around the AO. The same can be said for CIS networks and infrastructure. A Light Forward CP is better suited for fewer support staff to deploy, maintain and move, therefore placing fewer at risk.

- Clearly the larger is a CP, the easier it is to detect and strike. A light Forward CP is easier to disguise, and may appear as a target of less appeal to an enemy.

These advantages do outweigh the disadvantages. However there are also risks which need to be managed: through training and understanding of the processes carried out in each location, by each branch, and indeed by the staff in that branch. Command and Control (C2) needs to be defined clearly, with procedures in-place in the case of communications' loss for a prolonged period in order to ensure the mission continues, and is eventually won.

The stress on the support networks, both logistics and personnel, and technological must be tested and refined. Lessons identified and learned are key, as it is training at all levels. Fewer deployed personnel may mean more tasks are required of key personnel, so the personnel deployed must be similar to the Forward CP, agile, robust and flexible; ready to react, and have the trust both up and down the chain of command.

Organizational resilience is defined as "the ability of a system to withstand changes in its environment and still function."[1] It is a capability that involves organisations either being able to

endure the environmental changes without having to permanently adapt, or the organization is forced to adapt a new way of working that better suits the new environmental conditions.

NRDC-ITA tested the first draft of the Forward HQ with Exercise EAGLE LIGHT 18. Whilst this exercise was aimed primarily at the Support Elements of the CP, it exposed staff to the new ideas of Light Deployment and More Austere Living than perhaps some have become used to. Further development and refining will be required to ensure our organizational resilience, and to ensure the HQ competes to remain at the forefront of operational capability, with a trained, adaptable force structure able of meeting High Tempo operations against any threat.

Now the 5 structured NRDC-ITA CPs need to be tested and proven:

- TAC – getting the Commander as close to the battle, and more importantly the forward Formation Commanders, as possible, with minimal staff in order to continue C2 of the Operation.

- FORWARD – The lightest possible "Main HQ" in the AOR (Area of Responsibility) to control the operation.

- ALT – The backup of the Forward CP to enable moving the HQ around the AOR.

- MAIN – the upgrade of the Forward CP, for enduring operations where staff are required in the AOR.

- HBCC/REACHBACK – Enabling staff to work towards the Operation, from a safe area outside of the AOR.

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CREVAL, A DEMONSTRATION OF LAND COMPONENT COMMAND (LCC) CAPABILITIES

This article focuses on the HQ NRDC-ITA internal preparation to pass the "NATO Combat Readiness Evaluation" (CREVAL) in order to be certified as the Land Component Command (LCC) Headquarters (HQ) for the NATO Response Force (NRF) 2018.

What is a NATO CREVAL?

The aim of the CREVAL is to evaluate the combat readiness and the capabilities of all Allied Command Operations (ACO) Land HQs, formations and units and to identify any deficiencies that might impact on delivering the required capabilities. Thus a CREVAL is a NATO test designed to examine, in a structured way, NATO forces and to assess their capabilities and performance.

This process is carried out against defined NATO standards and criteria. The CREVAL process, ultimately, assures SACEUR that all a NATO Nation's declared forces are ready and able to perform the full range of potential missions.

CREVAL is based on the principle of "Trust but Verify", it represents a precise and efficient evaluation system of the Land Forces' capabilities that NATO Nations agreed to develop and maintain. Thus Readiness, Personnel strength, Materiel, Weapons and Equipment status are the key factors in a CREVAL. It occurs every four years. The final outcome is a Formal Report where an

HQ (or a formation/unit) is declared "Combat Ready" or "Not Combat Ready". In addition, the HQ/Unit receives a grading as Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal or Unsatisfactory.

NRDC-ITA required 20 months' preparation time to study and understand the CREVAL procedures and to plan "who does what, when, where and why". It has been a full operational planning effort and we approached the CREVAL as if a real operation.

Understanding the CREVAL "problem"

The CREVAL process is the demonstration of "Land Requirements" (in CREVAL terminology called "Criteria") related to an HQ (LCC, CORPS, DIV and BDE HQs) or to a Unit (up to Battalion size).

A requirement is the "ability" to conduct an activity, a process or a task. The ability to perform a requirement is done through the use of "capabilities", which are systems composed of personnel, training, equipment and standard procedures. With the proper capability it is possible to fulfil a task, so to satisfy a requirement (Criterion).

An HQ facing a CREVAL has to meet a checklist of different Criteria, grouped into five areas:

- Area A – Policy: Designed to examine and evaluate the HQ's ability to ensure Command Relationships, Agreements, Affiliation,

1   Wikipedia – organisational resilience

Multinational Participation, Doctrine and Policy and Training Systems;

- Area B – Operations: Focused on the HQ's ability to plan and conduct the full spectrum of operations from Arctic-to-Desert conditions;

- Area C – Support: An area designed to examine and assess the Support readiness and Sustainment capability including Equipment and Supplies, Maintenance, Movement and Transportation, Medical Support and Military Engineering (MILENG);

- Area D – Communication and Information Systems (CIS): This area examines the effectiveness of Command and Control (C2), CIS in peacetime and on operations;

- Area E – Administration: Designed to evaluate the provision of legal and political advice to the Commander, and to verify the effectiveness of manpower and financial management processes.

Each Criterion is divided in sub-questions, denominated "Performance Measures" (PM). It is necessary to respond to all PMs to demonstrate a single Criterion.

How NRDC-ITA HQ demonstrated its Capabilities

On February 2016, NRDC-ITA leadership created a bespoke planning group called the "CREVAL Headquarters Internal Steering Team" – or CHIST.

The CHIST was composed of 60 Officers (Colonels and Staff Officers) with expertise covering the entire spectrum of the five CREVAL areas.

The Chairman, a Brigadier-General, reported directly to the Chief Of Staff (COS); the CHIST Director was the Director of the Staff (DOS), responsible for the overall management of the CREVAL process (including the internal preparation and execution); the Coordinators of areas A, B, C, D and E had the responsibility to set the standards, to coordinate and supervise the development activity of their branch Subject Matter Experts (SME).

A key factor for the success was to assign each Criterion to an Officer with Primary Responsibility (OPR). He or she was responsible to demonstrate the criteria and performance measures assigned to him.

Since October 2016, NRDC-ITA started the coordination with LANDCOM Evaluation Team.

CHIST methodology

CHIST was tasked to define areas of responsibility, to analyse and assess the NRDC-ITA overall preparation status and coordinate efforts during the entire preparation time.

As a first step, it was important to know what we were facing.

The evaluation process, as mentioned, is done through a series of checklists. For each criterion a checklist: altogether 1470 performance measures, that means questions on capabilities, procedures and abilities that have to be answered with a definite YES, followed by a detailed "know how" explanation.

And all the above mentioned requirements gave the CHIST its method: to establish procedures and provide guidance; thus to pave the way for the HQ staff to achieve a "best" performance du-

ring the CREVAL itself. NRDC-ITA staff increased its expertise also through this self-evaluation process.

The process was bound into the LCC transition plan through a dedicated Line of Development (LoD) aimed at preparing the HQ for the CREVAL. This LoD 2 established the internal evaluation plan. (Picture 1 – LOD 2 Internal Evaluation Milestones).

CHIST took into consideration previous CREVALs, conducted by NRDC-ITA and other sister HQs. Observers were dispatched to view on-going CREVALs. NATO School Oberammergau was invited to teach a CREVAL course on site for 54 students.

To demonstrate each Criterion and Performance Measure NRDC-ITA OPRs prepared a dedicated "Dossier". Each dossier was a folder (electronic and hard copy) containing the documents covering the topic. A dossier could be composed of Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) or Standing Operating Instructions (SOI), official NATO documentation, briefings, pictures, video and minutes of specific study days, conferences, analysis or even documents related to activities conducted during previous exercises. Each dossier drafted by the OPR, was validated by respective Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOSs) and approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOSs).

NRDC-ITA HQ was able to send all Dossiers to LANDCOM Evaluation Team by 30 April 2017, 100 days prior the beginning of CREVAL Phase I. By doing that, the Evaluators had time to

study the documentation, send back comments, suggestions and recommendations.

Best Practices and Lessons Identified

On 11 October 2017, NRDC-ITA was declared "Combat Ready" with an outstanding grading of excellent in Area A, B, C, D and E.

According to LANDCOM Evaluation Team Chief, the CHIST has been recognized as "Best Practice". CHIST early planning, the identification of a precise methodology to demonstrate the "Criteria", the allocation of OPRs have been described by LANDCOM as a model for NATO HQs. The Evaluators highlighted additional innovative procedures and best practices that are shared across NATO structure to improve the combat effectiveness of NATO land forces.

The NATO CREVAL process is an opportunity for HQs and formations/units. Understanding, planning, proactive approach and dedication were the key to producing the outstanding NRDC-ITA's CREVAL result.

All the Staff worked hard for 20 months, from the Commander to the last corporal of the HQ. With the analysis of the recommendations included in the CREVAL Report, the identified "grey areas" have been addressed and there is an ongoing mitigation work. Thanks to the CREVAL process, NRDC-ITA is refining procedures and developing new concepts.

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
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